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CASE COMMENTS
freely to choose his business form in order to achieve favorable
tax results, other considerations are involved in a professional's
use of the corporate form. Additional tax liabilities, 43 the pos-
sibility of practical operating problems,44 and some ethical con-
siderations45 remain present. However, in spite of these issues,
and the fact that the entire question of professional incorpora-
tion is not finally settled, the instant case is important as a step
toward forcing an examination of the relevance of tax criteria
as applied to professional associations and corporations.
Trade Regulation: An Expanded Interpretation
of Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act
In 1961 the government instituted antitrust proceedings
against four major rock salt producers and distributors seeking
to punish and restrain a conspiracy to fix the price of deicing
rock salt.' Hardy Salt Company was named as a coconspirator
but not as a defendant in this action. Within one year after the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment obtained in the govern-
ment's civil action, private treble damage actions in which Hardy
was named as a defendant were initiated by several state and
local government agencies under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2
Hardy moved to dismiss on the ground that section 5(b) of
the Clayton Act 3 had not tolled the statute of limitations and
43. See generally J. MATRTEs, supra note 5, §§ 38.02-.14 (1967);
Anderson, supra note 2, at 314-16.
44. Deering, supra note 20, at 112-13. See also Eaton, supra
note 2, at 682-85.
45. ABA CoiMv. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPimoN No. 303 (1967).
1. Criminal indictments were returned on June 28, and civil anti-
trust actions were commenced on July 11, 1961, against Morton Salt,
Diamond Crystal Salt, International Salt, and Carey Salt Companies. Ajudgment returned in the civil action against Morton and Diamond
Crystal on November 24, 1964, was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme
Court in Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 44 (1965).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
3. Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by
the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of
any of the antitrust laws . .. , the running of the statute of
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising
under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter
complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the
pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: . . . any action
to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless
commenced either within the period of suspension or within
four years after the cause of action accrued.
38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
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hence the action was barred.4 Upon interlocutory appeal from
the district court's denial of this motion, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals heZd that where one who was named only as a co-
conspirator in a government antitrust action is subsequently a
defendant in a private suit, section 5(b) tolls the statute of
limitations during the pendency of and for one year following
the termination of the government litigation. Hardy Salt Com-
pany v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912
(1967).
Originally, section 5 of the Clayton Act provided for sus-
pension of the statute of limitations during the pendency of
any action arising out of any matter complained of in the gov-
ernment suit.5 These tolling provisions were initially construed
by the courts to be a necessary adjunct of the prima facie evi-
dence provisions of that section, which allowed a private litigant
to use a government obtained judgment or decree as prima facie
evidence in a subsequent action.6 As a consequence, the princi-
ples of collateral estoppel applicable to the evidentiary provisions
were also held to restrict the application of the tolling provi-
sions to parties who had been designated as defendants in previ-
ous government antitrust litigation.7
In 1955 Congress amended the Clayton Act. The tolling
provisions were extended to include a one-year period following
4. Unless the statute of limitation was tolled by § 5(b) the pri-
vate action would have been barred by § 4(b) of the Clayton Act which
provides: "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 4
or 4A shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued ... " 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964).
5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
6. The general implications discernible in the legislative history
of § 5 of the Clayton Act neither directly support nor refute this con-
struction. Section 5 was originally designed to encourage persons of
small means to bring antitrust actions. 51 CONG. REc. 1979 (1914) (re-
marks of President Wilson); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1914).
7. See Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO 'Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th
Cir. 1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exchs., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948);
Levy v. Paramount Pictures, 104 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1952); Christen-
sen v. Paramount Pictures, 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1950).
The coextensive construction of the evidentiary and the tolling
provisions reached its apex in Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.,
232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956), where the court held "[tihe same
means must be used to achieve the same objectives of the same con-
spiracies by the same defendants ... ." (Emphasis added.) A contrary
construction of the provisions of § 5 (b) first appeared in Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), where the court
indicated that only a "substantial identity" between the government
and the private action was necessary in order for the statute of limita-
tions to be tolled by § 5 (b). Id. at 570.
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termination of the government litigation8 and a uniform four-
year statute of limitations was established." The Supreme Court
in construing the amended section 5 expressly rejected, in Min-
nesota Mining v. New Jersey Wood Company,'0 the previous
construction that the tolling provisions were merely accessory
to the prima facie evidence provisions.
Minnesota Mining had argued that since the Federal Trade
Commission order could not be used as prima facie evidence in a
private action, section 5 (b) did not toll the statute of limitations
during the government litigation."1 Although the Court recog-
nized that the tolling provisions complemented the evidentiary
provisions, it stressed that Congress had intended the tolling pro-
visions "to serve a more comprehensive function" by aiding pri-
vate litigants in other ways as well.'2 The availability of docu-
ments at the close of government litigation, the resolution of
complex questions of law, and reliance upon government re-
sources and expertise were enumerated by the Court as bene-
ficial byproducts of freeing the tolling provisions from the re-
strictions of collateral estoppel. 3 It was also pointed out that
the phrase "final judgment or decree" appears in and is of vital
significance to the application of the evidentiary provisions, 4
while the tolling provisions are effective regardless of the final
outcome of the government litigation. 5
The Supreme Court again construed section 5(b) in Leh v.
General Petroleum Corporation,6 where the government anti-
8. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). This additional period of suspension
was included to insure that the private plaintiff would have an adequate
time upon conclusion of the government litigation to "study the Govern-
ment's case, estimate his own damages, assess the strength and validity
of his suit and prepare and file his complaint." H.R. REP. N-To. 422, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1955). However, its inclusion was also premised upon
the conviction that it would shorten the overall period of antitrust liti-
gation. Id.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1966). A uniform four-year statute of lim-
itations was established in order to eliminate obvious unfairness which
often resulted from the application of varying state statutes of limita-
tions. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955); Antitrust
Enforcement By Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble
Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1030-31 (1952); Note, Treble Damages
Time Limitations: Federalism Rampant, 60 YALE L.J. 553 (1951).
10. 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
11. Id. at 318.
12. Id. at 319.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 316.
15. Id. See also Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., 186
F. Supp. 704, 709-10 (N.D. li. 1956).
16. 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
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trust action and the subsequent private suit involved concentric
geographic areas, different but somewhat overlapping time spans,
and variations in named parties.17 The Court held that it was
not necessary that the two actions have "the same breadth and
scope in time and participants" in order to have the "substantial
identity" necessary to come within the "any matter complained
of" language of section 5 (b).18 The Court's adoption of the sub-
stantial identity test-liberally construing the statutory require-
ment that the suits be based on the same subject matter-lent
additional impetus to the Minnesota Mining construction of 5(b)
as an independent and vital provision of the antitrust laws.' 9
Finally, in Michigan v. Morton Salt Company,20 the district
court case out of which the instant case arose, the applicability
of section 5(b) to previously unnamed defendants was squarely
in issue.21  In a comprehensive opinion based primarily upon
Leh, the district court concluded that 5(b) had tolled the statute
of limitations as to all defendants in the private action, even
though some were neither parties to, nor named coconspirators in,
17. The private action out of which Leh arose did not include two
of the parties who had been defendants in the earlier government action.
The private complaint had also named a defendant who had not been in-
volved in the government action, but that defendant was dismissed from
the action prior to the appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 59-62.
18. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). Several explanations were also
offered by the Court for variations in named defendants which might
occur between the government and the private action which are unre-
lated to the government's claim.
In the interium between the filing of the two actions it may
have become apparent that a party named as a defendant by
the Government was in fact not a party to the antitrust viola-
tion alleged. Or the private plaintiff may prefer to limit his
suit to the defendants named by the Government whose activi-
ties contributed most directly to the injury of which he com-
plains. On the other hand, some of the conspirators whose ac-
tivities injured the private claimant may have been too low in
the conspiracy to be selected as named defendants or co-con-
spirators in the Government's necessarily broader net.
Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added).
19. For other analyses of Minnesota Mining and Leh see McSweeny,
The Statute of Limitations in Treble Damage Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Law-When the Period Begins and Tolling By Government
Actions and Fraudulent Concealment, 11 ATITRUST BULL 717 (1966);
Note, Clayton Act Tolling Provision-A New Interpretation, 23 WASH. &
LtE L. REV. 353 (1966).
20. 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966).
21. This issue had not been presented in either Minnesota Mining
or Leh. By the time those cases had been presented for appeal only pre-
viously named parties were still involved. See note 17 supra. In the in-
stant case at least one defendant in the private action, Cargo-Carriers,
had not been designated as either a defendant or as a coconspirator in
the government action. 259 F. Supp. at 53 n.16.
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the previous government litigation.22  The court concluded that
a liberal application of section 5(b) would promote the congres-
sional policy of aiding private antitrust litigants.
23
In the instant case the court of appeals has again interpreted
section 5(b) so as to extend possible benefits of previous gov-
ernment litigation to plaintiffs who institute private antitrust
actions. The court reasoned that including previously named
coconspirators within the ambit of the tolling provisions would
result in effective localization of the plaintiff's suit and enable
him to link his damages to those conspirators who most directly
caused his injury.2
Although the court recognized that a long line of earlier de-
cisions had restricted the application of section 5(b) to previ-
ously named defendants, it believed that the legislative history
of the statute neither dictated nor implicitly approved that lim-
ited construction. As the court aptly pointed out, the private
plaintiff orientation of the 1955 amendment coupled with Con-
gress' failure to concern itself with 5 (b)'s applicability to previ-
ously unnamed parties could not reasonably be construed as re-
22. 259 F. Supp. at 55. See New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 1 72,300 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 1967); Vermont v.
Cayuga Rock Salt Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 72,255 (D.
Me. Oct. 17, 1967) (reaching similar results). See also 67 CoLum. L.
REV. 572 (1967), where the conclusion was reached that the prejudice to
previously unnamed defendants requires that the application of the
tolling provisions be restricted to previously named parties. But see
55 GEO. L.J. 930 (1967), where the writer concluded that the district
court's interpretation could be justified in light of public policy con-
siderations.
23. 259 F. Supp. at 35. Application of the tolling provisions to
other than previously named defendants necessarily raises the problem
of adequate notice of possible outstanding claims. The district court, in
Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), indicated
that a defendant's familiarity with his affairs should enable him to
ascertain whether a potential antitrust claim could eventually be as-
serted against him. This concept of constructive notice through self-
familiarity has found recent implicit approval in New Jersey v. Morton
Salt Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) 72,300 (3d Cir. Dec. 8,
1967), where the court countered the lack of notice argument by stress
ing:
the "substantial identity" requirement [of Section 5(b)]
:.gives some assurance that the defendant ... may reasonably
be expected to have an awareness of the Government proceed-
ings. Otherwise the private plaintiff probably will not be able
to comply with the requirement ....
Id. at 34,751 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, Hardy's designation as coconspirator purportedly
afforded adequate notice of Hardy's susceptibility to subsequent private
antitrust actions.
24. 377 F.2d at 774-75.
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quiring a "niggardly application of the tolling provisions."25 The
court indicated that the clear and unambiguous language of sec-
tion 5 (b) also evidenced a congressional intent to give the tolling
provisions a broader interpretation than the evidentiary provi-
sions of section 5 (a) ;26 section 5 (b) refers to "private right of
action" and "any matter complained of" while the provisions of
5 (a) are applicable only to named defendants. 27
Minnesota Mining was relied upon by the court as discredit-
ing the view that section 5(b)'s benefits were to be commen-
surate with those available under section 5 (a) .28 Leh was said to
reaffirm Minnesota Mining's rejection of the previous limited
construction of section 5 (b) and to indicate a reluctance on the
part of the Supreme Court to deprive private plaintiffs of pos-
sible benefits solely on the basis of the government's arbitrary
choice of defendants. 29 Explanatory dicta from Leh in which
the Supreme Court had seemingly placed previously named
defendants and named coconspirators in the same category was
also reiterated for support.30
Despite the holding that inclusion of a previously named
coconspirator in a private action would not destroy the substan-
tial identity necessary for invocation of the tolling provisions,
the court's opinion indicates that all previously unnamed parties
cannot expect to remain beyond the reach of the tolling provi-
sions.3 1 While there can be little dispute with the court's
interpretation of legislative history, the language of the stat-
ute, or the import of Minnesota Mining and Leh, the court's
evaluation of underlying policy considerations is open to question.
The court is apparently prepared to conclude that the policy of
25. Id. at 772; see S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1955);
H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1955).
26. 377 F.2d at 774.
27. Id.; see note 3 supra.
28. 377 F.2d at 772.
29. Id. at 774.
30. Id.; see note 18 supra (emphasized portion). Additional support
for the court's holding can be found in those decisions which indicated
that whether the same matters were complained of in the private and
the government actions could be determined by juxtaposing the govern-
ment's complaint, statement of facts, and decree against the complaint
in the private action. See United Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 172
F. Supp. 580, 586 (D. Conn. 1959); Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland
Corp., 186 F. Supp. 704, 708 (N.D. III. 1956). This rather mechanical
test was reiterated in Leh and such an obvious comparison could be
made in the instant case since Hardy's name did appear in the govern-
ment complaint.
31. 377 F.2d at 775.
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achieving effective antitrust law enforcement through private
action outweighs the clearly enunciated competing policy of hav-
ing an effective statute of limitations applicable to antitrust ac-
tions.
At first glance, allowing the private plaintiff to make his
suit all-inclusive would appear to be of obvious merit. However,
it is clear that granting such discretionary latitude to the private
plaintiff is not an essential prerequisite to full and complete re-
covery. The plaintiff's federally created cause of action sounds
in tort and possesses the attribute of joint and several liability.32
Full monetary recovery could be obtained from any of the previ-
ously named defendants. As has been pointed out, "[t] he greatest
single hurdle to be surmounted in any private antitrust suit is
the securing of adequate competent evidence . . . that a viola-
tion has taken place and that the plaintiff has suffered com-
pensable damages . ... '33 The prima facie evidence provisions
of section 5(a) can be used to ease this burden in an action
against previously named defendants. Furthermore, the fact
that the statute of limitations may have run as to some potential
defendants would not prevent the plaintiff from using the sub-
poena powers and other discovery techniques to obtain informa-
tion from these unnamed parties. This still allows him to
"localize" his suit as to available defendants and prove the impact
of the conspiracy upon his trade or business.34
Balanced against any possible benefits inuring to the private
plaintiff as a result of the tolling provisions are the general
policy considerations which require having a statute of limita-
tions applicable to antitrust cases in the first instance. Gen-
erally such statutes are defendant oriented. They are designed
to prevent the assertion of stale claims and to insure that a de-
fendant has adequate notice of an impending suit within the
statutory period.3 5 They also are a means of providing the sta-
bility and certainty necessary for long-range participation in
business activities. In addition, Congress affirmatively ex-
pressed its conviction that a uniform, four-year statute would
32. Sun Theatres v. RKO Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284, 293 (7th
Cir. 1954).
33. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust,
3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 170 (1958) (emphasis added). For a general
discussion of difficulties which confront a private antitrust plaintiff see
Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1959); Guilfoil, Private Enforcement of U.S. Anti-
trust Law, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 747 (1965); Loevinger, supra.
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) & 45.
35. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
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best serve the interests of potential antitrust litigants by adding
such a provision to section 5(b) in 1955.86
The 1955 amendments to the tolling provisions can reason-
ably be viewed as a practical compromise between the propen-
sity to aid private antitrust litigants and the need for a short,
uniform statute of limitations. While it may be argued that
Congress contemplated the inclusion of named defendants only,
the court's extention of the tolling provisions to previously
named coconspirators does not grossly infringe upon the policies
which underlie those amendments. However, if complete dis-
parity of parties is no longer to be a major consideration in deter-
mining whether the private and the government actions have
the degree of "substantial identity" necessary for invocation of
the tolling provisions, and if a liberal construction is afforded
to whatever remains of the "substantial identity" test, Congress'
efforts to provide a uniform statute of limitations may be viewed
as an exercise in futility with respect to those large segments
of the business community which are or have been involved in
some form of government antitrust proceeding. Under the cur-
rent construction of section 5(b), tolling-with the period of
suspension determined solely by the often protracted period of
government antitrust activity-will become the rule rather than
the exception. The resulting burdens to potential defendants
may be onerous indeed when contrasted with the rather mini-
mal benefits afforded by the application of the tolling provi-
sions to previously unnamed parties.
36. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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